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Abstract
In this paper, we discuss Hintikka’s theory of interrogative approach to
inquiry with a focus on bracketing. First, we dispute the use of bracketing
in interrogative models of inquiry arguing that bracketing provides an
indispensable component of an inquiry. Then, we suggest a formal system
based on strategy logic and logic of paradox to describe the epistemic
aspects of an inquiry, and obtain a naturally paraconsistent system. The
formalism depends on Logic of Paradox and Strategy Logic. We then
apply our framework to some cases to illustrate its use.
Key words Hintikkan Interrogative model of inquiry, paraconsistency,
strategy logic.
1 Introduction
Hintikka’s interrogative inquiry is a well-known example of a dynamic epistemic
game procedure which can result in an increase in knowledge. In a nutshell,
in an interrogative inquiry, the inquirer is given a theory and a question. He
then tries to answer the question based on the theory by posing questions to
nature or an oracle. The initial formulation of this procedure is rather broad
and informal. The main aim of this paper is to address various issues in inter-
rogative models of inquiry, and suggest a formal analysis. First, we motivate
our formalism with some philosophical observations at length and then present
a formal framework which can provide an expressive syntax for the issues we
raise in this article. Then we apply the formalism to various examples regarding
interrogative inquiry.
For Hintikka, “[the] interrogative model is simplicity itself” [18]. That is cer-
tainly true, but also a call for extensions. Hintikka argued that the basic model
of interrogative inquiry had some room for ignorance, but not uncertainty, which
led him to introduce probabilistic elements to the theory [18]. Later on, first-
order and tableaux based extensions of interrogative models were also intro-
duced [21]. Even if there have been various extensions of interrogative models,
to the best of our knowledge, none of them seem to address non-classical logical
concerns [14, 16]. In this work, we argue that the theory needs a non-classical
logical touch as it already contains some such elements implicitly rendering the
theory not deductively explosive.
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Deductive explosion describes the situation where any formula can be de-
duced from an inconsistent set of formulas. In deductively explosive logics, we
have {ϕ,¬ϕ} ` ψ for any formula ϕ and ψ where ` is a logical consequence
relation. In this respect, both classical and intuitionistic logics are known to
be deductively explosive. Paraconsistent logic, on the other hand, is the um-
brella term for the logical systems where the logical consequence relation is not
explosive [10, 35, 36]. Paraconsistency is a proof theoretical concept, and its
semantical counterpart, dialetheism, suggests that there are true contradictions.
Paraconsistency presents itself in various areas in epistemology and ontology
[36, 27, 34]. More relevantly, paraconsistent discussive systems were analyzed by
Jas´kowski [23]. Carnielli, in a relatively recent paper, briefly discussed similar
issues without suggesting a formal framework, and argued that “the problem of
coping with contradictory information belongs to interrogative games” [8]. This
motivates our work.
2 Hintikka’s Theory of Interrogative Inquiry
Hintikka introduced his interrogative theory of scientific inquiry in 1984, and
proposed a game theoretical reading for it [17, 19]. Some extensions of the
system (probabilistic, first-order) were also suggested later [18, 21, 22]. Addi-
tionally, from a view point of philosophy of science, interrogative inquiry relates
to the discussions on context of discovery [13]. Such an approach has also been
analyzed formally, relating the interrogative inquiry to Hintikkan game theo-
retical semantics [30, 31]. Epistemically, the inquiry game can be viewed as a
game between the Inquirer and the Nature (or Oracle) who will be denoted as
I and N respectively.
In the interrogative model of inquiry (IMI, henceforth), the inquirer is given
a starting theory T and a question usually of the form “Q or not-Q?” to be
answered, even though the given question does not necessarily have to be in
the form of a polar question. Hintikka assumes T as a “truly general theory”
(his emphasis), and does not allow it to have constants, and consequently im-
poses that the question is formulated in the same language as T [17]. These
two conditions are quite natural. Limiting the inquiry to (complex or ground)
propositional objects makes the questioning aspect sensible. Otherwise, simply
put, what can be questioned about the constants? Secondly, if the questions
were to be syntactically formulated in a different formal framework than the
theory we are working with, this mismatch would make the inquiry almost im-
possible. In short, algebraic group theory cannot be expected to produce an
answer for questions about the nutritional needs of pregnant women.
In an IMI game, the Inquirer has two options. He is allowed to ask questions
to the oracle or draw conclusions by using T and the answers he has already
received (and supposedly by using the derivation rules of classical logic). But,
what can the player I ask? Hintikka introduces several restrictions on the admis-
sibility of questions. First, he imposes that “the presuppositions of the question
to be asked” should already have been proved by I [17]. Second, Hintikka in-
troduces his Atomistic Postulate as another restriction, even though it is not
generally considered as an essential feature of IMI. This postulate stipulates
that the player I may ask N “only questions about the truth or falsity of par-
ticular atomic sentences” concerning the model. The reason for this is quite
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simple: for the complex sentences with Boolean connectives, the proof rules
make it possible for I to deduce further results. We believe these restrictions
are quite natural, translating the framework of scientific and epistemic inquiry
into the language of formal systems. One of those methods in this translation
that Hintikka suggests is bracketing.
3 Bracketing and Paraconsistency
Hintikka introduces bracketing as a tool to omit irrelevant or uncertain answers
during an interrogative inquiry.
An important aspect of this general applicability of the interrogative
model is its ability to handle uncertain answers - that is, answers that
may be false. The model can be extended to this case simply by al-
lowing the inquirer to tentatively disregard (“bracket”) answers that
are dubious. (...) Equally obviously, further inquiry might lead the
inquirer to reinstate (“unbracket”) a previously bracketed answer.
This means thinking of interrogative inquiry as a self-corrective pro-
cess.
[20, p. 3]
This is clearly a very sensible idea. Not everything uttered in a dialogue may
be relevant or truthful. We may need to be able to select the answers that are
relevant to our inquiry. Also, undoing must be allowed in the form of unbracket-
ing a previously omitted piece of knowledge. This is where strategizing becomes
central, and Hintikka describes the need for an answer-selection procedure as
follows.
In a typical application of interrogative inquiry - for instance in the
cross-examination of a witness in a court of law - the inquirer cannot
simply accept all answers at their face value. They can be false.
Hence we must have rules allowing the rejection or, as I will call it,
the “bracketing of an answer”, and rules governing such bracketing.
But this seems totally unrealistic. How can we possibly hope to for-
mulate realistic rules for the rejection or acceptance of any answers
- any data - that an inquirer might ever receive?
[20, p. 223]
Hintikka suggests a rather relaxed and “natural” framework for bracket-
ing; yet, in this paper, we maintain that bracketing is an overkill and suffers
from various problems. We categorize them as epistemic, game theoretical, and
heuristic problems.
Epistemically, there seems to be a major problem in bracketing, as Hintikka
pointed out as well. In an inquiry, how can the inquirer know which answers
to ignore? How can he know what to reject or accept? This epistemic problem
empties the notion of bracketing. In other words, if inquiry is a procedure dur-
ing which we want to acquire and learn information, this implies that we did not
have that information before. Moreover, by the rules of the IMI game, we also
did not have the presuppositions that may lead us to that piece of information.
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By iteration, this line of argument can be carried on ad infinitum. We simply do
not know what to ignore or what to accept, unless our understanding of inquiry
is limited to the situations where we only want to hear the answer from our
opponent. In short, an interrogative inquiry should not be confused with what
I call a legal inquiry. In a legal inquiry, the task is only to make the opponent
confess while the inquirer has sufficient background information, priors or pre-
suppositions about the information to be confessed. This is where Hintikka’s
legal inquiry differs from an epistemic inquiry. Because, in an epistemic inquiry,
we are supposed to be searching and looking for some information that we did
not have before. We cannot discard some responses in favor of or against some
questions or propositions - simply because we do not know the answer.
The epistemic problem appears to be connected to the issue of derivation
in an inquiry. Rules of the IMI game allow us to use the previous answers we
obtained during our inquiry. But this does not necessarily mean that we need
to incorporate all the answers we have received into the inquiry. Some answers
may be helpful, some may not. This procedure calls for a choice mechanism. In
an investigative deduction, how can we know which propositions and answers
to use?1.
A game theoretical response can be given to eliminate this problem. It can
be suggested that, in an IMI game, the inquirer simply chooses the assumptions
and responses that help him win the game. If the inquirer can win the game
with a particular set of assumptions, then he can adopt those assumptions for
a win. If he cannot, then he simply selects another set of assumptions and
answers, and keeps playing. However, this objection undermines the agency
and rationality of the players. In a game theoretical setting, each player follows
a strategy, and employs a method to choose their moves, and, by definition,
the strategy is predetermined based on some understanding of rationality and
players’ priors and epistemics. Players decide how they will play before they
start playing the game. If we allow them to exercise their choice of moves based
on their a posteriori success, that means that they did not have an a priori
strategy before the game. Therefore, such an objection clashes with the basic
definition of a strategy - a function that tells the player which move(s) to make
at each state based on what moves the other players have made.
Additionally, bracketing poses another game theoretical problem as it seems
to ignore the element of rationality in the game. In an inquiry game, all parties
have an intrinsic prior commitment to play the game to engage in the dialogue,
and solve or win the interrogative inquiry which can be viewed as a game.
Questions and answers should be assumed somewhat relevant to each other,
otherwise the dialogue would turn into two parallel simultaneous monologues.
Suggesting the use of bracketing for such a trivial purpose is unnecessary as it
ignores the rational commitment of the players in the inquiry. Putting it game
theoretically, irrelevant answers may be signals or a part of a strategy, thus can
be an integral part of the game - especially in imperfect information games.
Finally, bracketing suffers from various problems from a heuristic point of
view as well. First, let us remember the Lakatosian concept of “proofs that do
1Clearly, this is an age-old question which goes back to Aquinas and Aristotle, and latter’s
use of the term ‘analytic’ in argumentation and deductions makes it historically relevant to
our discussion here [29]. Hintikka himself mentions this issue very briefly on passing [20]. A
further connection to what proposition can be used how many times in a deduction or an
inquiry relates this debate to linear logic [15].
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not prove” which is directly relevant and helpful to our investigation. Lakatosian
methodology of proofs and refutations, as exemplified in Proofs and Refutations,
discusses the significant roles of thought experiments and unsound deductions in
mathematical reasoning, among many other things [26, 5, 4, 9, 24]. “Proofs that
do not prove” are the proofs that are wrong in some ways, yet help us develop
better proofs or improve the actual false proof. Lakatos discusses this idea in
detail, and explains its role in concept formation with many historical exam-
ples. For Lakatosian epistemology, in an evolutionary and practice based sense,
mathematical concepts develop, improve and then they are falsified, proven and
disproven along their conceptual development. Mathematical activity continues,
concepts are redeveloped, proofs are reexamined.
In short, “proof attempts” and “proofs that do not prove” help us improve
the proofs. However, if we bracket the “proofs that do not prove”, we risk the
growth of (mathematical) knowledge, and lose the opportunity to learn from our
mistakes. Clearly, not every mistake is didactic, and in order to distinguish them
we need to resort to the semantics and the model. Additionally, what we suggest
here does not mean that we should include every single bit of information in the
deductive process. In other words, the presence of contradictory statements, in
practice, do not explode the formal system or render it trivial. It may even help
us develop the theory further, even if we expect the emergence of additional
inconsistencies or even if we expect to obtain a consistent final theory at the
end.
However, it can be claimed that our proposal is rather pessimistic, and
assumes a non-cooperative nature of inquiry. A non-cooperative inquiry, in this
context, is a form of inquiry where the parties do not necessarily help each other
in the process. However, cooperative inquiries suffer from the aforementioned
epistemic, game theoretical and heuristic issues as well. Imagine a child asking
questions to her parents who are trying to answer her question. For instance,
when a child receives an incorrect answer from her parents (as a result of an
honest mistake in the case of a cooperative inquiry, or as a result of a lie in the
case of a non-cooperative inquiry, for example), the child may not identify it as
a wrong answer and accepts it regardless. In this case, we may not expect the
child to apply bracketing even if the parents try to deceive her, or even if the
parents try to help her.
In conclusion, if bracketing is not intended for epistemic, game theoretical
and heuristic reasons, then it is employed to avoid contradictions. In an inquiry,
it is possible to receive answers that contradict each other - such answers may
be a part of a strategy (lying, cheating, in non-cooperative cases), they may
be honest mistakes (in cooperative cases), or communication problems (noise in
the communication in either cooperative or non-cooperative cases). Therefore,
if we are committed to classical logic as the underlying formalism of IMI, then
contradictions will trivialize the system according to the classical logical presup-
positions. In order to avoid trivialization, we will argue that IMI necessitates a
paraconsistent framework.
Now, we can discuss whether IMI is explosive, or more importantly, if it
should be explosive. Let us now elaborate why we answer both questions nega-
tively.
Let us consider an inquiry where p and ¬p are received as responses. First,
the very existence of both p and ¬p is an information or a game theoretical
signal. The history of science and mathematics offers numerous cases where a
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scientific inquiry progressed under the very existence of inconsistencies [36]. It
can also be argued that the nature of the contradictions and the contradictory
propositions provide some information that can be used in the course of the
inquiry, and this necessitates the study of inconsistencies as opposed to simply
ignoring them. Second, the very existence of contradictory statements provides
a broader understanding of rationality - a rational player in paraconsistent IMI
is not a dreamer, but a realistic inquirer who does not let his system collapse
under the presence of a mere contradiction or conflicting information.
Additionally, the reason as to why Jas´kowski’s discussive logic is not explo-
sive applies to IMI as well [23]. In an inquiry, assume that player I receives
two answers p and ¬p at different times during the inquiry. Nevertheless, it is
completely possible that there exists a proposition q which is nowhere true in
the model. Thus, q may not be deducible under the presence of a contradiction.
Therefore, for some p and q, we observe p,¬p 6` q concluding that inquiries are
not explosive. This shows that the interrogative inquiry is perhaps one of the
canonical applications of paraconsistent epistemology.
On the other hand, there are some partial, classical logic oriented responses
to our remarks. In [21, §8,], the authors discuss the strategic aspects of the
question-answer process of the interrogative inquiry, and give various rules for
bracketing which do not seem to add anything new to the discussion. Formal
epistemological concerns raised by Hintikka above can be remedied by consider-
ing a variety of non-classical logics. For instance, linear logics of Girard offers a
“resource” based analysis of proofs [15]. Such a proof-theoretical approach may
give more meaning to questions and answers by considering whether they have
been used earlier in the dialogue. This line of research may associate interroga-
tive models to intuitionistic logics and substructural logics. Similarly, dialogical
logic has some relevance to paraconsistency bridging over to interrogative in-
quiries [38, 39]. Additionally, the dynamic aspects of IMI have been studied
by Hamami who views IMI and dynamic epistemic logics complimentary [16].
Such an approach centers its attention to the questioning aspect of IMI without
underlining the role of classical logic in the process. Similarly, IMI can be seen
as an applicable tool in some other issues in logic [14].
Based on these observations, we can now discuss a formal framework for
paraconsistent interrogative inquiry.
4 Formal Matters: ParaIMI
In this section, we suggest a formal framework to express the philosophical
concerns we raised about IMI. We achieve it by combining Priest’s logic of
paradox (LP), Hintikka’s Interrogative Model of Inquiry (IMI) and a dynamic
game logic.
LP introduces an additional truth value P , called paradoxical (P ), for the
sentences which are both true and false. The truth value “true” (T ) is for the
sentences which are true but not false. Similarly, the truth value “false” (F )
is for those which are false but not true. Based on these definitions, the truth
tables for LP are given as follows [32].
Implication and bi-implication are defined in the standard fashion. As Priest
remarked, the following do not always hold in LP as expected [32].
• ϕ,¬ϕ |= ψ
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¬
T F
P P
F T
∧ T P F
T T P F
P P P F
F F F F
∨ T P F
T T T T
P T P P
F T P F
• ϕ,¬ϕ ∨ ψ |= ψ
• ϕ,ϕ→ ψ |= ψ
• ϕ→ ψ,¬ψ |= ¬ϕ
• ϕ→ ψ ∧ ¬ψ |= ¬ϕ
LP is simple and easy-to-work with, but does not sufficiently address the
game theoretical and epistemic issues we discussed. The system we need should
be (i) inconsistency friendly, (ii) strong enough to describe game theoretical
strategies in an inquiry, (iii) capable of handling multi-agent cases, and (iv)
expressive enough to describe actions/moves in games. For this aim, we use
a segment of strategy logic where strategies are taken as logical primitives [40,
41, 2]. In strategy logic, one can reason about the strategies and describe
preconditions for moves beyond the traditional Boolean connectives. We call
our system ParaIMI - paraconsistent interrogative inquiry.
Let us now present the formal matters. First, let Σ be the set of moves
common to set of players n, and denote the set of propositional variables by P.
We follow the common methodology and interpret the game on a tree where
each node denotes a game state, and the labeled edges indicate the moves.
Additionally, we also have a tool that designates the turns of the players. We
define ParaIMI models as follows.
Definition 4.1. A ParaIMI game tree T is defined as a tuple T = (W,⇒, w0)
where W is a non-empty set with w0 ∈W , and the partial function⇒: W×Σ→
W specifies the labeled edges of the tree where the labels represent the moves.
The extensive form ParaIMI game tree then is the pair (T, t) where T is as
before and t : W → n specifies whose turn it is at each state. A ParaIMI model
M then is defined as the tuple M = (T, t, V ) where T and t are as before, and
V is a valuation function assigning subsets of W to propositional variables.
Let us explicate the model further. First, the model allows multiple players
simply to allocate more than one inquirer and oracle. In an inquiry, it is perfectly
possible to have more than one inquirer with matching or competing strategies
directing questions to the same set of oracles. The turn function t is introduced
as inquirers and oracles may not take turns regularly. Finally, the set of moves
Σ is common to all agents to reflect the reasonable restrictions that Hintikka
imposed on IMI - a shared syntax for the players.
A strategy is defined as a subtree of T that specifies what moves to play
for a certain player when it is his turn. Therefore, for a player i ∈ n, strategy
si for i is a function si : Wi → ℘(Σ) where Wi is the set of w ∈ W where
t(w) = i that is Wi is the set of states where it is i’s turn to play. Strategies
give rise to strategy trees per player, and the formulas are evaluated at strategy
trees. There are several reasons for this choice. First, an inquiry is a strategic
Australasian Journal of Logic (13:2) 2016, Article no. 1
28
process, not an automated, fully deductive reasoning. Therefore, evaluating the
truth of logical formulas with respect to a strategy tree and oracles’ answers is
a sensible idea. Second, strategy trees localize the model. This is an important
point from a game theoretical perspective. The agents have local information
and local strategies, as they may not know their opponent’s strategy. Finally,
this formalism allocates the oracles. The information that the oracle provides
can be taken as a precondition when it is evaluated at a strategy tree. Then,
the agent can decide which move to make given what the oracle has said. Let
us now formally introduce strategy trees [41].
Definition 4.2. For a player i, and a strategy s(i), the strategy tree Ts(i) =
(Ws(i),⇒s(i), w0, ts(i)) is the least subtree of T satisfying (1) w0 ∈Ws(i), (2) for
any w in Ws(i), if t(w) = i; then there exists a w
′ in Ws(i) and a move a such
that ⇒s(i) (w, a) = w′ (or w a⇒s(i) w′). If t(w) 6= i; then for all w′ with w a⇒ w′
for some a, we have w
a⇒s(i) w′.
The above definition specifies that the root (the start of the game or the
current state) is included in the strategy tree, and when it is the player’s turn,
his moves at those states are included in the strategy tree. If it is not his turn,
then all possible accessible nodes are included in the tree just because the player
cannot know how the opponents may play. We will write Ts instead of Tsi to
simplify the notation when it is obvious.
It is essential to underline that the very definition of a strategy tree illustrates
how we can avoid bracketing. The strategies count in all possible moves of the
opponent, they do not exclude (or bracket out) some of them. If the inquiry
is between an inquirer and nature, then the oracle’s answer is assumed to be
among nature’s possible moves.
The syntax of ParaIMI is given as follows.
p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ϕ i a
where p ∈ P and a ∈ Σ. We will drop the subscripts when possible for easy
reading. In order to reflect Hintikka’s concerns, we did not specify the logical
constants. Yet, from a formal perspective, they can easily be appended.
The formula ϕ  i a with the dynamic operator  i means that when the
precondition ϕ is satisfied, then the agent i makes an a move. In other words,
it is a controller to see whether the move that i made is compatible with the
strategy or not. This makes it clear why we evaluate formulas at the strategy
trees.
Now, what does ϕ  i a signify in the context of inquiry? In a scientific
inquiry for instance, it can denote the steps to take after making an observation:
when scientist i makes an observation (ϕ), then based on this observation, he
proceeds to some action a (some further experimentation, calculation, revision,
etc). The key point is that the whole process (ϕ  i a) may or may not agree
with his strategy, which is his research program aiming at proving a scientific
hypothesis in this case. And then the framework of ParaIMI allows us to describe
this situation. We believe this is one of the strengths of ParaIMI and justifies
the use of strategy logic to explore it.
The semantics of the Booleans are standard, hence skipped. We give the
semantics of the dynamic operator  i as follows.
Ts(i), w |= ϕ i a iff M,w |= ϕ implies a = outs(w)
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where outs(w) is an outgoing labeled edge from w with respect to the strategy
s. The semantical definition simply indicates that when a precondition is met,
the strategy tells us which action to take. If ϕ has the paradoxical truth value
P , for instance, this formula states what move to make when a paradoxical
sentence (such as Russell’s Sentence) is the precondition. This eliminates the
need to bracket some propositions out to maintain consistency.
Now, we can briefly compare ParaIMI with the one given in [21]. One of the
most interesting theorems in the aforementioned work, the Yes - No Theorem,
states that any conclusion that can be deduced by using various instrumental
questions can be deduced by yes - no questions. The Yes - No Theorem fails
in ParaIMI in its stated form. The reason is that for some formulas, ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ
is not a truly yes-no question since the formula ϕ may be paradoxical, and the
paradoxical truth value P is a fixed-point in LP under the negation operator.
This suggests that it is not possible to obtain P from the other truth values
with a negation and this renders polar questions in IMI not sufficient.
As we mentioned earlier, the oracle’s answers must be among the possible
moves of the player nature. These answers produce a strategy tree that deter-
mines the play of the inquirer I. In this case, the oracle guides the inquirer I
by giving him the exact specifications as depicted below.
w
w1
...
a1
...
b1
a
w2
...
a2
...
b2
b
This diagram represents the strategy tree of the inquirer I where the curly
branches identify the actual actions/moves taken based on the oracle’s answers.
For instance, at state w1, the oracle is asked a question, and the answer I
receives directs him to b1. Thus, we observe the following.
Lemma 4.3. In ParaIMI, the subtree that is constructed after the responses of
the oracle is a subtree of the strategy tree of I.
The proof of the above lemma follows from the definitions. In order to
see how the argument works, assume otherwise. If the responses of the oracle
are not part of the strategy, then the player cannot make any moves based on
the responses. Also, by definition, every possible move of the player nature is
included in the inquirer’s strategy in which the oracle’s responses lie. This result
ensures that the oracle’s answers are not only correct, but also relevant.
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Now, we call a strategy tree minimal if it does not contain a smaller strategy
subtree with the same root. A minimal strategy tree need not be unique.
Lemma 4.4. An inquiry that is conducted based on the oracle’s responses at
each state is the unique minimal strategy tree.
Proof. Let us call the sub-tree constructed based on the oracle’s responses as
To. First, let us show it is minimal. For a contradiction, assume there is a tree
T ′o ⊂ To constructed by the oracle’s responses. However, as T ′o ⊂ To, To contains
some moves (branches) based on the oracle’s responses which are not included
in T ′o. But, T
′
o was also constructed by the responses of the oracles, and must
have included those branches and moves (responses). Contradiction shows that
To is minimal.
Now, let us show it is unique. Assume T is another minimal tree constructed
based on the oracle’s responses with the same length. We will show T and To
are identical.
First, we define the length l(T ) of a tree T as the shortest path between the
root and the terminal nodes. The proof is by induction on the length of the
trees l.
For, l = 0, by definition, the root belongs to both To and T . So, the claim
holds.
Assume that both To and T are identical up to l = n in order to show that
the claim holds l = n+1. At length n, the strategy tree is constructed by asking
which move to make to the oracle. The answer then included in to both To and
T to obtain a tree of length n+ 1. In this case, both To and T remain identical
at length n+ 1.
By induction, the claim holds for any n. So, To and T are identical. Thus,
To is unique.
Lemma 4.5. Every strategy has a unique minimal strategy that coincides with
the oracle’s strategy.
Proof. Given a strategy σ for I, Lemma 4.3 shows that the oracle’s responses
form a subtree To of Tσ where Tσ is the strategy tree based on σ. By Lemma 4.4,
To is unique and minimal, and combining these two result, σ has a unique
minimal subtree To.
Notice that each strategy, with or without the help of the oracle, can be
reduced to a minimal strategy. However, for the uniqueness, we need an input
from the oracle.
We only assumed that the oracle is a truth-teller. However, it is possible to
impose further conditions on the oracle. An oracle is said to have state-based
rationality if at each state in the ParaIMI model, the oracle gives the most
rational response (not only the correct one), that is, the answer that brings
the highest pay-off. Such a state based rationality can be represented by a
proposition [11, 42]. The strategy that is constructed with the responses of the
oracle that has state-based rationality will be called the rational strategy. In
the following, we assume one oracle for simplicity as the ideas can easily be
generalized to the situations with multiple oracles.
Lemma 4.6. If we assume state-based rationality for the oracle, than the in-
quiry conducted with the help of the oracle has the rational strategy.
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Proof. The proof follows from the definitions. Let the oracle have state-based
rationality. For a contradiction, assume that the inquiry conducted with the
help of the oracle does not admit the rational strategy. By definition, this
suggests that, at least at one state, the oracle does not offer the most rational
response. But this violates the initial assumption of state-based rationality for
the oracle. Thus, the inquirer’s strategy must be rational.
Now we observe that the rational strategy need not be a minimal strategy.
Lemma 4.7. Every rational strategy has a minimal rational strategy.
Proof. Let σ be a rational strategy. By Lemma 4.5, σ has a minimal strategy
σ′. Then, we need to show that σ′ is rational.
Assume not. Then, there is a response by the oracle in σ′ that is not rational.
However, this response also belongs to σ which was assumed to be rational. The
contradiction shows that σ′ ⊆ σ is minimal.
Based on the lemmas we have given above, the following theorem follows.
Theorem 4.8. The best strategy for the inquiry game in ParaIMI can be ob-
tained by introducing the oracle’s answers and the assumption of state-based
rationality as a set of premise to the inquiry.
Proof. Notice first that this is the generalized version of the Strategy Theorem
in [21]. We will only sketch the proof idea here.
By the previous lemmas, it follows that the minimal rational strategy can be
constructed by the oracle’s answers and the assumption of state-based rational-
ity. Therefore, treating the rationality as a proposition that holds at the states
that are part of the rational strategy, we can simply turn them into assumptions
in the inquiry. Additionally, if this strategy is not the best one, then there is a
better one, which needs to be included in the rational strategy. This violates the
initial assumption (towards contradiction that) the strategy was not the best
one.
It is important to observe the strengths of ParaIMI which stem from LP.
For an arbitrary strategy tree Ts and a state w on Ts, we observe that Ts, w |=
ϕ∨¬ϕ a does not always hold as there is a truth value beyond true and false.
This means that polar questions are not sufficient for ParaIMI. In the classical
IMI, we need to raise one question, say, ϕ∨¬ϕ. In ParaIMI, the corresponding
questions, for an action a are as follows:
• ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ a
• ϕ ∨ P  a
• ¬ϕ ∨ P  a
This level of complexity may raise some doubts about the computational
cost of the process. The following argument resolves this issue.
Theorem 4.9. The computational complexity of asking questions to the oracle
and constructing a rational strategy tree in ParaIMI is the same as performing
the same operation in the classical IMI.
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Proof. In ParaIMI, the paradoxical truth value complicates the inquiry only by
a constant. Therefore, both IMI and ParaIMI belong to the same complexity
class.
The above theorem can also be viewed as another argument against brack-
eting on the basis of computational cost.
Another interesting issue in dynamic games and classical logic is duality.
Classically, if a player has a winning strategy to verify the formula ϕ, then he
cannot have a winning strategy for its negation ¬ϕ. This result does not hold
in ParaIMI, due to the paradoxical truth value. If the inquirer has a winning
strategy, that is a strategy that certainly brings him a win for a paradoxical
formula; then he also has a strategy for the negation of that paradoxical for-
mula, which is still paradoxical. Therefore, the duality between negations and
possessing winning strategies is broken in ParaIMI.
Theorem 4.10. In IMI, if the inquirer I can rationally strategize about an
inquiry about ϕ and prove it with the help of an oracle, then I cannot prove ¬ϕ.
This is not the case in ParaIMI.
Proof. The argument is straight-forward for (classical) IMI.
In order to see why the argument fails in ParaIMI, assume ϕ has a truth
value P . Then, by definition, ¬ϕ has truth value P as well. Thus, it is possible
for a rational strategy to prove ϕ and ¬ϕ at the same time in ParaIMI.
Strategy trees can be instrumental in understanding the epistemic aspects
of interrogative inquiries. What we have discussed above indicates that given
a rational strategy σ, it is possible to obtain a minimal strategy that coincides
with the oracle’s. In this process, the inquirer I poses questions to the oracle.
Given a rational strategy σ, we call the minimum number of questions that I
needs to ask to the oracle in order to construct the minimal rational strategy
σ′ as jumps, and denote it with j(Tσ) for a given strategy tree Tσ.
Proposition 4.11. For a strategy tree T , j(T ) ≤ l(T ).
Proof. The proof directly follows from the definitions. Because asking more
questions to the oracle than the length of the tree Tσ for a rational strategy σ
would lead to constructing a minimal rational strategy tree Tσ′ for a minimal
rational strategy σ′ where l(Tσ′) > Tσ. This contradicts the minimality of
σ′.
We call an inquiry game determined if all the players know their pay-offs.
Proposition 4.12. Interrogative inquiries conducted with an oracle with state-
based rationality are determined.
Proof. Since LP is decidable, and for a rational strategy σ, j(Tσ) is bounded,
each Tσ has to be finite. If the pay-offs are not known, this entails that at
some point in the game, the oracle did not give out the rational response that
might have brought the highest pay-off. This contradicts with the state-based
rationality of the oracle. Thus, the inquirer knows his pay-off once the oracle
has state-based rationality.
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It is important to see that jumps help the inquirer to handle the epistemic
indistinguishability in the game. Let us consider the simple game of Prisoners’
Dilemma in its extensive normal form where the utility pair (uA, uB) denotes
the utility of the players A and B respectively. In this context, A and B are
considered as inquirers. The moves c and d denote “cooperate” and “defect”
respectively. In the extensive form game tree, the dots between B’s moves
indicate that they are epistemically indistinguishable for A. They are the exact
points for A for an oracle inquiry. Based on the below utilities for both agents,
the traditional game theoretical view suggests that the rational move is to defect
(make a d move).2 Nevertheless, as long as the players do not know their
opponent’s move, they will never know their exact pay-offs.
A
B
(3, 3)
c
(1, 4)
d
c
B
(4, 1)
c
(2, 2)
d
d
An oracle can solve this problem. If B asks the oracle how A has played, then
he can know his exact pay-off. Then, jumps are the epistemic states where agents
can eliminate some epistemic possibilities based on oracle’s answers. In this
fashion, it is possible to identify jumps with epistemic indistinguishable states.
The inquirer therefore is supposed to dissolve the epistemic indistinguishabilities
in the game by posing questions to the oracle. Epistemic indistinguishable states
form information sets. In the above example, the states connected by a dotted-
line form an information set.
Theorem 4.13. In a finite strategy tree T , the total number of the information
sets is bound by j(T ).
Proof. Assume otherwise and suppose the total number of the information sets
is n > j(T ) for a given strategy tree T . Therefore, there will be an epistemic
state w in an information set which is indistinguishable for player I (such as
the states for B in Prisoners’ Dilemma), and I will not be a able to inquire to
the oracle to determine the minimal rational strategy in order to maximize his
pay-off. Thus, I will not have a minimal rational strategy. But, according to
Lemma 4.4, we know that the minimal rational strategy exists for I. Thus, we
obtain a contradiction and n > j(T ) cannot be the case.
The above theorem simply specifies that the inquires for the oracle include
the epistemic ones.
*
2It is an essential and fruitful debate whether the traditional view of rationality presupposes
or necessitates classical logic, and whether paraconsistent logic entails a broader reading of
game theoretical rationality. However, for the purposes of the current paper, we will leave
this discussion aside.
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Our treatment of ParaIMI does not address the erotetic aspects of IMI, in-
stead focuses on its strategic, dynamic and interactive aspects. There have been
some formal attempts to achieve this task which goes back to Belnap and Steel
[7, 1, 43, 21, 44]. Additionally, some formal approaches to classical IMI were also
presented relatively recently [14, 16, 28]. To the best of our knowledge, some of
the ideas we have put forward in this article have been discussed in a different
framework by Batens [6]. Batens motivates his formalism with the need to “con-
struct explanations from inconsistent knowledge”, and shows how a “coherent
theory of the process of explanation is obtained from inconsistent knowledge”
(ibid). Both the current paper and [6] argue that inconsistencies need not be
removed during the process of explanation and “one cannot simply discard” an
inconsistent theory just because it is inconsistent. Batens, in his work, uses an
inconsistency-adaptive logic to develop his interrogative model, and his achieve-
ment can briefly be summarized as replacing the classical logical framework of
[21] with inconsistency-adaptive logics, and consequently implement the neces-
sary changes both in the model and in the deductive rules accordingly.
5 Some Uses of ParaIMI
ParaIMI can provide a wider perspective in illustrating various aspects of in-
quiry. In this section, we focus on some applications to show how ParaIMI can
be useful in expressing inquisitive and inconsistency-friendly aspects of inter-
rogative inquiry.
The first example brings together bracketing and inquiry in an interesting
way, and illustrates it quite clearly as to why bracketing must be avoided in a
scientific inquiry.
Example 5.1. Let us consider Lakatos’s seminal work Proofs and Refutations
[26, 24, 9, 3, 4]. Proofs and Refutations is written in an interrogative dialogue
form where the inquirers examine the conjecture and battle with examples and
counter-examples. In the dialogue, the inquirers try to figure out whether Eu-
ler’s conjecture holds. The conjecture, as it is specified initially in Proofs and
Refutations, claims that for all polyhedra, we have V −E+F = 2 where V,E, F
are the numbers of vertices, edges and faces of the polyhedron in question re-
spectively. Let us denote the conjecture by χ.
At some stage of the inquiry, the dialogue includes both sentences χ and
¬χ with their supporting examples and refuting counter-examples. Different
sets of inquirers deduce the aforementioned sentences based on some distinct
set of examples and counterexamples. For instance, regular cube verifies the
conjecture and yields χ. Similarly, hollow cube (which is a cube from which
a smaller cube is removed) is a counter-example and refutes the conjecture
yielding ¬χ. For Lakatos, this is one of the important stages of the growth of
knowledge as the conjecture is modified and improved at each stage. Lakatosian
methodology has a strategy which describes what to do when contradictions
emerge without trivializing the system.
Let us assume that based on a regular cube (for which the conjecture holds)
and hollow-cube (for which the conjecture does not hold), we have the state-
ments χ and ¬χ. In this situation, Lakatosian strategy has a method that sug-
gests to redefine the terms (which is “polyhedron” in this case). Let us denote
this move with ReDefine, and the associated strategy tree with Tr. Therefore,
Australasian Journal of Logic (13:2) 2016, Article no. 1
35
after the cube and hollow-cube are observed, at some state w of Tr, we have
Tr, w |= χ ∧ ¬χ based on the previous answers (cube and hollow-cube) we have
received. Since our Lakatosian methodology tells us what to do in this contra-
dictory situation, we also observe that Tr, w |= (χ∧¬χ) ReDefine, or simply,
by a slight abuse of notation, we observe that Tr, w |= P  ReDefine holds:
when a contradictory statement of this sort is reached, redefine the terms. No-
tice that it is possible that at some state in the inquiry game, the statement
P  ReDefine may fail if redefining the terms is not available methodologi-
cally, or needs to be avoided to prevent an ad hoc strategy, which Lakatos also
addressed.
Lakatos describes various other actions for the cases when inconsistencies
emerge. These actions include re-examining the proof, incorporating lemmas
to the statement, declaring some counter-examples as exceptions (or monsters
as Lakatos calls them), and define these strategies within various strategic
frameworks. Therefore, ParaIMI for Lakatosian methodology has satisfiable
statements such as P  ReExamineProof, P  IncorporateLemma, and P  
DeclareExceptions where P is the paradoxical truth value.
As observed, the Lakatosian method does not bracket out the contradictions
in an inquiry, and this is one of the central tenets of the method of proofs and
refutations even if the Lakatosian method is not paraconsistency-friendly.
We can generalize the above idea to belief revision.
Example 5.2. Paraconsistent logic can directly be applied to belief revision
theory [12, 34, 27]. From an IMI view point, the interrogative inquiry can be
considered between the inquirer and the nature where the inquirer discovers an
inconsistency and asks questions as to how to revise the formal model of the
inquiry. The questions he asks, in this case, are in the form of various rules of
belief revision theory such as contraction and revision rules.
For this example, let us consider the following case. Assume that you thought
you had your wallet with you with some cash in it. Then, you go to a restaurant
to eat, and after the meal, you want to pay the bill. You try to reach your
wallet only to realize that you left it home. This new information, added to
your belief set, creates a contradiction. According to your current state w, it
is both true and false that you believe that you have your wallet with you.
Your “thought” suggests that you had your wallet with you, and at the same
time, the evidence suggests that you simply did not have it. Then, as a rational
person, you know what to do. You either explain the situation to the waiter,
or call a friend for help. Therefore, in this belief model, non-classically, we
have Ts, w |= P  CallAFriend for some strategy tree Ts. Belief revision theory,
being a classical logical theory originally, aims at resolving the contradiction by
revising the theory, and offers descriptive ways on how to revise the theory [12].
Notice that the contribution that ParaIMI provides here is to introduce
actions and strategies in a paraconsistent model. This amounts to the fact that
some different ways of model revision can be represented with respect to various
strategic approaches. Also, it can express inconsistencies, and describe what the
agent should do when the inconsistencies are present. This is a rather improved
approach to the phenomena than what is presented in [21].
Priest offered some insights on the subject as well.
People often have inconsistent commitments. (...) Yet it is absurd to
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suppose that a person who has inconsistent commitments is thereby
committed to everything. If, by oversight, I believe both that I will
give a talk on campus at noon, but also that I will be in town at noon,
this hardly commits me to believing that the Battle of Hastings was
in 1939. (...) Worse, it is not at all clear that an ideally rational
agent must have consistent beliefs. Sometimes there is overwhelming
evidence for inconsistent beliefs.
[34]
However, our take on the subject is rather different than Priest’s. We allow
(and accept) that some agents may strive for being an ideally rational agent.
Some of such agents can be computer abstractions, agents of artificial intelli-
gence or queries in some databases with possible inconsistencies. Nevertheless,
even if that is the case, there is some state in the model at which inconsisten-
cies occur and they do not collapse the model. Following the initial thought-
experiment with the wallet, when you have an inconsistent belief whether you
have your wallet with you or not, you first acknowledge the inconsistent belief,
and then choose to revise it. Thus, before the revision and until the verification
of the revision, the model is inconsistent, yet allows a (classical logic induced)
rational deduction - the deduction that says that the model should be revised.
However, some other logical frameworks can be given, as Priest did in [34], in
such a way that after the emergence of the inconsistent belief, the agent may
choose some other action.
In our example, we have Ts, w |= P  CallAFriend, in some other, we can
endorse Tu, w |= P without any action attached where s and u are strategies with
their associated strategy trees. Therefore, without resorting to any assumption
of rationality, ParaIMI can express various strategic actions under the presence
of an inconsistent situation.
A relatively recent work discusses the interrogative and erotetic aspects of
IMI from a formal perspective. We now observe how ParaIIMI can enrich the
discussions of such formalisms.
Example 5.3. Let us now discuss a case from Genot [14]. In his work, Genot
offers a formal framework for IMI with tableaux method based on [21]. A
central theme of this proposal is to incorporate the theory of belief revision
and game theory into IMI, and bracketing plays an important role in Genot’s
formalization. Following Genot’s representation, by !ϕ let us denote the action
of answering with the statement ϕ. Namely, once asked ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ, an agent can
respond by an action !ϕ. Similarly, by ?ϕ, we denote the action of asking
whether it is the case that ϕ.
?T(ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2)
!Tϕi
(ϕi ∈ A)
?T¬(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2)
!T¬ϕi
(¬ϕi ∈ A)
ϕ ∈ A
?T(ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ)
!Tϕ
Figure 1: Genot’s IMI game trees for some connectives [14].
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Here, we reproduce some of the semantic trees that Genot gives where A
denotes the set of available answers. We now show how they can be represented
in ParaIMI. The first two trees in Figure 1 are classical. In the setting of
ParaIMI, we represent them with ϕ1∨ϕ2  !ϕi where ϕi ∈ A, and ¬(ϕ1∧ϕ2) 
!¬ϕi where ¬ϕi ∈ A.
The third tree in Figure 1 uses the resolution rule which is not valid in
ParaIMI as we remarked earlier in Section 4. However, the prefix T assures
that the truth value is T (as opposed to P or F ) which validates the scheme in
ParaIMI. In this case, it is a case of resolution restricted only to one truth value
of ParaIMI. In ParaIMI, we can introduce an additional prefix P which stands
for the truth value P . We suggest the following additional rules:
?P(ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2)
!Tϕi
(ϕi ∈ A)
!Pϕi
?P¬(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2)
!P¬ϕi
ϕ ∈ A
?P(ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ)
!Pϕ
The last case is interesting. Here, if the question itself for an answer ϕ
is paradoxical, then ϕ itself turns out to be paradoxical. Clearly, this heavily
depends on the form of the question (ϕ∨¬ϕ) and the truth table for disjunction.
These rules can easily be extended to other cases and connectives, and we leave
it to the reader.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we first discussed bracketing in detail, and argued against its use
in IMI. Motivated by our observations, we proposed a paraconsistent framework
for IMI, and detailed its use in various examples. Our contributions included
various game logical results that related ParaIMI to some other work in the
field, and underlined the benefits of using an inconsistency-friendly formalism.
There are several issues which we did not focus in this work. For instance, we
did not discuss the computational aspects of IMI or ParaIMI in detail. An inter-
esting observation is that interrogative inquiry and inquiry in some declarative
programming languages (such as prolog) have some interesting similarities. The
way such languages handle negation (closed world assumption) and negations
in (paraconsistent or not) interrogative inquiries present exciting new research
directions.
The careful reader may have noticed that we paid some but insufficient at-
tention to various Lakatosian concepts. The connection between paraconsistent
inquiry and Lakatosian methodology is stronger than it might seem. The path
between the two goes through Hegelian dialectic, and requires a special treat-
ment which falls outside the scope of the current paper [4, 33, 37, 25].
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